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FIXING WATCHES WITH SLEDGEHAMMERS:
THE QUESTIONABLE EMBRACE OF EMPLOYEE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT TRAINING BY THE LEGAL PROFESSION*
Susan Bisom-Rapp"
I. INTRODUCTION
Although judicially recognized as a form of sex discrimination for
over two decades,1 sexual harassment remains a persistent problem for
many American workers, especially those who are women. The recent
suits brought against and ultimately settled by Mitsubishi and Ford
illustrate how pervasive sexual harassment can be in a given workplace
and, more importantly, how difficult it can be to eradicate.2 Such
working conditions clearly take their toll. Social science research
consistently concludes that sex harassment produces adverse "psycho-
logical, job related, and health effects."3
Awareness about sexual harassment and fear of liability has
prompted many employers to promulgate sexual harassment policies
* This essay is based in part on work previously published by the author. See
Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure:
Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. Emp. & LAB. L. 1 (2001).
** Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law; B.S. Cornell
University, 1983; J.D. University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1987; LL.M.
Columbia University, 1994; J.S.D. Columbia University, 1997. This essay was written
for presentation at the Ben J. Altheimer Symposium: The Impact of Science on Legal
Decisions in March 2001. Sincere thanks go to Terri Beiner, Julie Greenberg, and
Linda Krieger for insightful commentary.
1. Sexual harassment was judicially recognized as a form of sex discrimination
in 1976. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For important critiques of
current sexual harassment doctrine see Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1169 (1998); Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of
Women's Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 117 (2001);
Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, I I l HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997);
Katherine Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997);
Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 6 1
U. Prr. L. REV. 671 (2000); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment-Normative, Descriptive, andDoctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner
and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 169 (2001); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
2. See Reed Abelson, If Women Complain, Does Ford Listen?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28,
2001, at BUI; Joann Muller, Ford: The High Cost of Harassment, Bus. WK., Nov. 15,
1999, at 94; Plan To Distribute Mitsubishi Settlement is Approved by Judge, WALL ST. J.,
June 28, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5458102 [hereinafter Mitsubishi Settlement].
3. Liberty J. Munson et al., Longitudinal Analysis of Dispositional Influences and
Sexual Harassment: Effects on Job and Psychological Outcomes, PERSONNEL PSYCHOL., Apr.
1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 19364662.
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and adopt sexual harassment training programs. This essay interrogates
the widely shared conviction that drives sexual harassment training: the
belief that employee education can prevent, or at least greatly curb,
sexual harassment. This premise, broadly held and rarely questioned by
the legal profession, has spawned a multi-billion dollar sexual harass-
ment training industry staffed by attorneys, consultants, and human
resource professionals who offer programs aimed at litigation preven-
tion.4
Focusing on the twin claims typically made by training advo-
cates-that education can alter employee behavior5 and limit employer
liability for harassment 6 -this essay examines the empirical support for
the first claim and assesses the response of courts in sexual harassment
suits to evidence that employers conducted training. In fact, as will be
discussed below, there is absolutely no empirical support for the
premise behind the instruction--that it fosters employee tolerance and
greatly alters workplace culture. Nonetheless, over time, the second
claim of training advocates--that it limits liability for harassment-has
proven to be true. Training programs were initially cited by lower courts
as favorable evidence for employers that reasonable steps had been
taken to prevent or correct harassment. Moreover, a recent turn in the
United States Supreme Court's civil rights jurisprudence explicitly
confirms the accuracy of the training advocates' assertions-training
programs do indeed limit liability for harassment.
4. Stuart Silverstein, Fear of Lawsuits Spurs the Birth of a New Industry, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 1998, at Al.
5. E.g., Barry J. Baroni, Unwelcome Advances: Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,
TRAINING & DEV., May 1992, at 19-20 (stating that employees who are taught about
actionable conduct tend to avoid it); Joanne Cole, Legal Sexual Harassment: New Rules,
New Behavior, HR FOCUS, Mar. 1999, at 1, 14 (citing consultant Darlene Orlov, who
says that her work involves "changing behavior"); Mindy Friedler, Sexual Harassment:
Prevention Is Best Cure, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 11, 1994, at 5 (implying that training can help
employees become aware that some behavior is objectionable); Rebecca A. Thacker
& Haidee Allerton, Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, TRAINING & DEv.,
Feb. 1992, at 50-51 (arguing that sexual harassment "training can be the first step
toward eliminating the behavior").
6. E.g., Jennifer J. Laabs, Sexual Harassment, PERSONNEL J., Feb. 1995, at 36
("When you combine a strong policy, regular training and a detailed and timely
investigation procedure into your sexual harassment strategy, experts agree that you
may have a fighting chance in limiting your liability."); Garry G. Mathiason & Mark
A. de Bernardo, The Emerging Law of Training, FED. LAW., May 1998, at 24, 31 ("[Ilt is
now very clear that employers face significant liability if they fail to thoroughly train
employees in all aspects of sexual harassment."); Eric Wallach & Stacey B. Creem,
Handling Sexual Harassment Charges in the Workplace, N.Y. L.J., July 16, 1996, at I
(describing a "comprehensive education program" as the first step employers can take
"to insulate themselves from liability").
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To facilitate the discussion of the Supreme Court's embrace of
employee education, this essay references a sociology study that
provides the basis for a more insightful understanding of the implica-
tions of the training phenomenon.7 The study is part of a recent strand
of law and society research. Rather than view law as an autonomous
force imposed upon the culture that it regulates, socio-legal scholars
increasingly acknowledge that those subject to legal regulation act upon
and influence legal rules." Recognizing a "complex reciprocality"
between "law-on-the-books" and society at large, the focus of this
research is "law-in-action"; i.e., an examination of how formal legal
rules are "altered, manipulated, elaborated, or ignored by social
actors."9
In the employment area, this approach requires examining employ-
ers' responses to and effect upon employment discrimination law. A
close look at the decades-long practice of sexual harassment training
reveals why the Supreme Court's civil rights jurisprudence took the turn
that it has and highlights the danger inherent in allowing those subject
to the law to define its terms.
II. UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES TO AND EFFECT UPON
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
Sociologists are able to document an impressive range of
employer-initiated policy innovations since the passage of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).'0 Responding to the ambiguity
in civil rights legislation, which prohibits discrimination but does not
require specific employment actions beyond that, organizations acted
to demonstrate their adherence to principles of equality and to the law
itself." The compliance structures created include: nonunion grievance
7. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
8. Eg., Frank Munger, Mapping Law and Society, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES:
TRADmONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN LAW AND SOcfiTY RESEARCH 21, 53 (Austin Sarat
et al. eds., 1998).
9. Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 903, 907-08
(1997).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2.
11. Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen M. Petterson, Symbols and Substance in
Organizational Response to Civil Rights Law, 17 RES. SoC. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY
107,108 (1999).
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procedures,12 equal employment opportunity (EEO) and affirmative
action offices, 3 formal promotion mechanisms, 4 and employment-at-
will clauses designed to forestall wrongful discharge suits. 5 Anti-
discrimination training has long been a part of the organizational
response. 16
One particular sociological study, however, has had a profound
impact on my thinking about preventative practices such as sexual
harassment training and their role in catalyzing doctrinal change.
Lauren Edelman and her colleagues recently provided strong support
for the theory that the process of regulation in the civil rights area is
endogenous."' Rather than view law as an outside force imposed upon
organizations, their theory of legal endogeneity posits that the "content
and meaning of law is determined [by the organizations] it is designed
to regulate."' 8 Edelman and her colleagues argue that employers and
their advocates actively create the definition of legal compliance with
anti-discrimination law and that courts, over time, legitimate those
efforts by making them relevant to the determination of liability. 9 The
authors use EEO grievance procedures, a common litigation prevention
tool, as an example of this process.
The study's review of business and professional journals revealed
that in the late 1970s and early 1980s human resource professionals and
management attorneys began making claims that grievance procedures
would shield employers from liability for discrimination.20 At that time,
however, there was almost no legal support for such an assertion. In
fact, few discrimination cases before the mid-1980s even mention
grievance procedures.' By the mid-1980s, however, "the theme that
12. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401 (1990).
13. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531 (1992).
14. Frank Dobbin et al., Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction of Internal Labor
Markets, 99 AM. J. Soc. 396 (1993).
15. John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to
Uncertainty in US. Firms, 1955-1985, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 794 (1996).
16. Edelman, supra note 12, at 1435.
17. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance
Procedures As Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406 (1999).
18. Id. at 407.
19. See id. at 409.
20. Id. at 412-13.
21. Id. at 432.
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grievance procedures could internalize disputes and gain favor with
courts" was well established in the personnel literature.2
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided a sexual harassment case that
provided a big boost for the claim that a grievance procedure could
forestall liability.' In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,24 the Court for the
first time recognized that unwelcome sexual advances that create a
hostile work environment violate Title VII' As important as that ruling
is, it is actually dicta in the opinion that provided support for grievance
procedure advocates. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist, in a
section of the opinion discussing employer liability for hostile work
environment harassment, directly addressed an interesting argument
posited by the defense. The bank argued that its anti-discrimination
policy and the victim's failure to use an established employee grievance
procedure to complain about her supervisor's harassment should
insulate it from liability.26
Justice Rehnquist rejected the employer's argument, noting that the
bank's anti-discrimination policy did not specifically discuss sexual
harassment. Moreover, the grievance procedure required that the
employee complain directly to her supervisor, an action most victims
would be reluctant to take when the harassment perpetrator is that very
same supervisor." Rehnquist did note, however, that the bank's defense
would be far "stronger if its procedures were better calculated to
encourage victims of harassment to come forward."2 This observation
implicitly suggests that employers might be able to shield themselves
from liability by adopting procedures for preventing or minimizing
harassment when it occurs.
Edelman's study found that after the Vinson decision, employers
began increasingly to raise grievance procedures as a bar to liability and
lower courts increasingly began to defer to their arguments.2 Twelve
years after the Court's decision in Vinson, the Supreme Court fully
incorporated the grievance procedure defense into sexual harassment
doctrine in two decisions,3" which will be discussed more fully below.3
22. Edleman et al., supra note 17, at 414.
23. Id. at 434-35.
24. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
25. Id. at 65.
26. Id. at 70-73.
27. Id. at 73.
28. Id. at 73.
29. Edelman et al., supra note 17, at 439.
30. Id. at 435-36.
31. See infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
20011
UALR LAW REVIEW
Thus, those subject to anti-discrimination law, through their responses
to it, defined a form of legal compliance ultimately recognized and
legitimated by the judiciary. 2 In other words, the law has come to
greatly resemble the claims made in the personnel literature in the late
1970s and early 1980s.
There are problems, however, with allowing those parties con-
strained by a law to define its terms. Grievance procedures, for
example, may actually undercut the legal rights of the employees who
use them.3 Edelman and her colleagues warn that the absence of due
process protections, the lack of the full panoply of remedies available
in litigation, and the propensity of complaint handlers to recast
complaints as managerial problems rather than instances of discrimina-
tion may adversely affect the claims of grievants.34 Moreover, employ-
ees may be legitimately concerned about retaliation or decisionmaker
bias and decide not to use such procedures.35 If courts uncritically
accept grievance procedures, without understanding the subtle
organizational context in which they are located, "legal ideals may be
compromised."36
The study's admonitory conclusions are highly relevant to the
practice of sexual harassment training. Part III provides what I hope is
a nuanced interpretation of those educational efforts and their effects on
sexual harassment doctrine based on Edleman's theory of legal
endogeneity.
III. A NUANCED INTERPRETATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT TRAINING
AND DOCTRINE
Sexual harassment training nicely fits Edelman's endogeneity
model because it is an example of organizations actively creating the
terms of legal compliance and judicial deference to those efforts.
Comprehensive employee education has been promoted as a method for
32. See Edelman et al., supra note 17, at 436.
33. See id. at 448-49. For a fascinating and much more optimistic appraisal of
employers' internal problem-solving systems, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001).
34. See Edelman et al., supra note 17, at 448-49; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation ofRights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 497 (1993).
35. See Edelman et al., supra note 17, at 448-49; see also Krieger, supra note 1, at
185-86 (describing the reasons why women fail to report sexual harassment through
formal channels).
36. Edelman et al., supra note 17, at 449.
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preventing employment litigation for at least two decades. As one early
training advocate noted, "[t]he key to reducing an employer's exposure
to unjust dismissal and other employment-related litigation is supervisor
training.""' By 1990, anti-discrimination seminars were quite common. 8
Harassment training, in particular, can be understood as an
employer response to ambiguity in civil rights law.39 A brief history of
that response and the Supreme Court's recent endorsement of it will be
discussed in Sections A and B below.
A. Sexual Harassment Training as a Response to Ambiguity in Civil
Rights Law
Many of the first anti-discrimination training programs were
designed to educate management on the subject of sexual harassment.'
Such workshops were likely prompted in great part by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) 1980 Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex (Guidelines).4 The Guidelines expressly
define sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII,42 and at the time of
their adoption chillingly stated that employers were strictly liable for
supervisor harassment."3 Harassment prevention is also referenced in the
Guidelines as "the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment.""
Suggested preventative steps that employers should undertake include
informing employees of their rights and how to raise harassment claims,
as well as "developing methods to sensitize all concerned."'
There are a few important points to note about the prevention
provision and the Guidelines in general. First, while the section on
37. Susan G. Tanenbaum, Employee Relations Guide, in ADVANCED STRATEGIES IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 483, 515 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. 342, 1987).
38. See Edelman, supra note 12, at 1435 (noting that respondents in the study
"repeatedly emphasized the value of ... workshops" that "demystify" Title VII and
teach supervisors techniques that make it more likely that an organization will "prevail
in lawsuits").
39. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
40. Sally Jacobs, Sexual Harassment, 7 NEW ENG. Bus. 25 (1985), available at 1985
WL 2254793.
41. See id. Early court cases and Catherine MacKinnon's pathbreaking book on the
subject no doubt also influenced employer responses. See supra note 1; see generally
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2001).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (2001). This provision of the Guidelines was
subsequently rescinded.
44. 29C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2001).
45. Id.
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prevention does not specifically mention educational programs, training
is one obvious method by which a workforce can be sensitized and
information can be conveyed about sexual harassment. Thus, while
employers had to make an inferential leap to settle on training as a
preventative technique, that leap was a small one.
Second, as one early commentator correctly noted, the provision
"doles] not imply, much less guarantee, the adoption of affirmative
steps will immunize an employer from liability."46 Yet the underlying
logic of the provision is apparent: the best way to avoid liability is to
decrease the incidence of harassment, which may perhaps be accom-
plished by taking the affirmative steps recommended. Indeed, the
commentator himself recommended supervisory training in sexual
harassment law as a necessary component of a preventative program.47
Third, it was understood at the time of the issuance of the Guide-
lines that they were not binding on the courts.48 Rather, the rulings,
interpretations, and opinions issued by the EEOC were and continue to
be considered "a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' 9 Thus, although
it was possible that the courts might ultimately disregard the Guide-
lines, the risk that they might be judicially embraced certainly existed.
Harking back to the sociological studies described in Part II, it makes
sense that the ambiguity in the law-represented by both the Guidelines
and the first harassment cases-prompted many employers to promul-
gate sexual harassment policies and develop training programs in the
wake of the Guidelines' publication."0 Notably, these early educational
efforts were initiated despite the absence of a doctrinal mandate for
training nor any express judicial statement that such programs could
limit employer liability.
Over time, sexual harassment training has become a routine feature
of the American workplace, with annual revenue for the training
industry estimated to be in the billions.5 Management attorneys and
human resource specialists regularly counsel employers to educate
46. Fred W. Suggs, Jr., Advising Your Corporate Client on Avoiding Charges of Sexual
Harassment, 46 ALA. LAW. 176, 180 (1985).
47. See id. at 181.
48. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (noting that the EEOC
does not have authority under Title VII to promulgate binding, substantive regulations).
49. Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
50. See Horace A. Thompson I1, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment after
Vinson: The Regulation of 'Romance' in the Workplace, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW
AND LMGATION 239, 249 (1989); Jacobs, supra note 40.
51. Silverstein, supra note 4, at A14.
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employees in all aspects of sexual harassment in order to reduce the
frequency of potentially actionable conduct, and correspondingly,
employer liability.52 Because litigation prevention remains the primary
objective of sexual harassment training," important cases like the 1986
Vinson decision, which made no mention of employee education at all
but raised a host of questions about employer compliance, appear to
fuel the training trend."' Indeed, demand for sexual harassment training
has reportedly increased since 1998, when the Supreme Court handed
down two decisions that signaled a major shift in Title VII jurispru-
dence and, ultimately, express judicial incorporation of the longstanding
employer practice of harassment training into legal doctrine. 5
52. See Thompson, supra note 50, at 256 (noting that written policies are
ineffective without "training of supervisors regarding prohibited conduct"); Baroni,
supra note 5, at 19 (noting that "education and training can be an effective prevention
tool"); Thacker & Allerton, supra note 5, at 50 ("Keep harassment incidents at bay by
training employees in how to respond to them."); Howard G. Ziff & Donald G. Cherry,
Clear Policies Prevent Claims of Harassment, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at SI ("Supervisors
must be trained about sexual harassment."). The typical course has three integrated
components. First and foremost, the workshops are designed to educate employees
about applicable law. Mathiason & de Bernardo, supra note 6, at 31; Wallach & Creem,
supra note 6, at 1. Next, the programs also function to disseminate information about
the particular employer's sexual harassment policy and grievance procedure. Mathiason
& de Bernardo, supra note 6, at 31; Wallach & Creem, supra note 6, at 1. Finally,
training often aims to sensitize employees about permissible and prohibited behavior.
Donald R. Livingston, Current Developments in Sexual Harassment Law, in GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, TWELFTH ANNUAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY UPDATE
211, 229-30 (1994); Jay W. Waks, Curbing Sexual Harassment in the Firms, in THIRD
ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW & LITIGATION CONFERENCE 131, 135 (1994) (reprinted from
NATL. L.J., Aug. 2, 1993) (discussing basic elements of a comprehensive sexual
harassment policy); Wallach & Creem, supra note 6, at 1. Those attending sexual
harassment seminars are frequently shown videotaped vignettes, and engage in role-
playing and discussions of the course material. Cole, supra note 5, at 1; Laabs, supra
note 6, at 36; Hellen Hemphill & Ray Haines, Confronting Discrimination in Your
Workplace, HR Focus, July 1998, at S5; Brigid Moynahan, Creating Harassment-Free
Zones, TRAINING & DEV., May 1993, at 70.
53. See Joann Keyton & Steven C. Rhodes, Organizational Sexual Harassment:
Translating Research into Application, 27 J. OF APPLIED COMM. RES. 158, 161 (1999).
54. See Donald J. Petersen & Douglas P. Massengill, Sexual Harassment Cases Five
Years After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 18 EMPLOYEE RELS. L.J. 489, 514 (1993)
(concluding that harassment training is an important measure in preventing costly
litigation).
55. See Peter Aronson, Justices' Sex Harassment Decisions Spark Fears, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 9, 1998, at Al (noting that since the decisions "employment law specialists are
reporting a dramatic increase in inquiries and requests for training"); Rebecca Ganzel,
What Sexual Harassment Training Really Prevents, TRAINING, Oct. 1, 1998, at 86, 87
(describing the recent attention generated by the decisions as a "bonanza for
independent trainers and employment lawyers alike"); Robert Mullins, Law Firms Sell
Acumen in Harassment Policy, Bus. J.-MILWAUKEE, Aug. 7, 1998, at 21; Kathy Robertson,
Sex Talk Keeps Ex-FBI Agents Busy, Bus. J.-SACRAMENTO, Feb. 5, 1999, at 3. Contra Carol
2001-]
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B. The Supreme Court's Endorsement of Employee Education
Lauren Edelman's legal endogeneity theory posits that organiza-
tions covered by civil rights law devise legal compliance strategies that
the courts subsequently incorporate into legal doctrine. Evidence for the
endogeneity phenomenon may be found in twin landmark sexual
harassment decisions issued in 1998 and in a watershed 1999 punitive
damages decision. In those cases, the Supreme Court legitimated the
extensive employer practice of employee training. I dub the legal
philosophy that emerged from the cases "the jurisprudence of education
and prevention."
Employer and employee advocates alike hailed the Supreme
Court's opinions 6 in Burlington Industries v. Ellert57 and Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton.5" Both cases addressed an issue that had long vexed the
lower courts. Specifically, the Ellerth and Faragher opinions answered
the question of how to determine employer liability for harassment
perpetrated by a supervisor.
Using principles of agency law, the Court divided sexual harass-
ment cases into two categories: those in which a supervisor has taken
a "tangible employment action against the subordinate"59 and those in
which no such action has occurred.' In the former category, vicarious
liability is always appropriate because the ability to change a subordi-
nate's employment status is by definition aided by the existence of the
agency relationship between the supervisor and the employer.
In the latter case, if there has been no definitive action like a firing
or demotion, the assistance a supervisor receives by virtue of the
authority delegated to him or her by the employer is less clear.
Vicarious liability for the supervisor's harassment, stated the majorities
in both cases, should therefore be more limited. To facilitate that
limitation, the Court fashioned an affirmative defense for employers
faced with claims in this category. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Kleiman, Companies Dragging Feet on Training, ClI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1998, at 1, available
at 1998 WL 2897636 (claiming that the increase in demand for sexual harassment
training has been small).
56. Eg., Ganzel, supra note 55 (noting "many corporations hailed with relief the
Supreme Court's June 26 rulings"); Linda Greenhouse, Court Spells Out Rules for Finding
Sex Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1998, at Al (noting that "[t]he rulings won praise
across a broad spectrum of both management and civil rights groups").
57. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
58. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
59. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
60. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
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majority in Ellerth, noted: "The defense comprises two necessary
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise."6'
Employers need not always prove that they had an anti-harassment
policy and complaint procedure to claim the defense. The necessity for
such prophylactic devices, however, "may appropriately be addressed
in any case when litigating the first element of the defense." 2 More-
over, while the plaintiff-employee's failure to use a complaint proce-
dure is not the only way to establish the second prong of the defense, "a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer's burden." 3
While agency principles form part of the justification for the new
affirmative defense, Justice Kennedy found additional considerations
implicit in Vinson. Elucidating a new understanding of the preventative
aim of Title VII, Kennedy noted in a striking passage that the statute "is
designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies and
effective grievance mechanisms." To the extent these policies act as
incentives for employees to report harassment before it becomes severe
or pervasive, Kennedy noted, limiting vicarious liability advances "Title
VII's deterrent purpose." 5
This conceptualization of discrimination prevention is a far cry
from that offered by a long line of Supreme Court cases. Under
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody" and its progeny, the prophylactic purpose
of Title VII is advanced by the fear of money damages, which inspires
employers to purge their workplaces of discriminatory policies and
practices.67 Under Ellerth, fear of liability motivates employers to create
procedures that victims must use or forfeit their right to recover for
harm caused by discrimination. The term "prevention" is thus aligned
with the kinds of litigation prevention techniques long recommended by
defense attorneys and human resource professionals. Indeed, these
professionals began recommending grievance procedures as litigation
61. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
62. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
63. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
64. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
65. Id.
66. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
67. Seeid. at 417-18.
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
avoidance mechanisms beginning in the early 1980s, before Vinson was
decided.6
Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Faragher, likewise
referenced anti-discrimination law's deterrent aim in discussing the new
affirmative defense.69 Citing Albemarle, Justice Souter re-characterized
the prophylactic purpose of Title VII, stating that the primary objective
of the statute is "to avoid harm.""0 This rather anemic assertion of
statutory purpose stands in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's earlier
declaration that the "'primary objective' of Title VII is to bring
employment discrimination to an end."'"
Gone is the image from Albemarle of employers stamping out
workplace discrimination when it occurs. In its stead, Souter provides
the figure of a benevolent employer "informing employees of their right
to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment."" Like Kennedy,
Souter's vision of prevention focuses on policy creation. Unlike
Kennedy's vision, it appears also to incorporate instruction. It is not
enough for an employer to promulgate a sexual harassment policy. The
policy must also be disseminated and its contents communicated to
employees. In fact, failure to distribute an existing policy precluded the
defendant in Faragher from raising the affirmative defense on remand.'
Late in the 1998-99 term, Justice O'Connor provided the clearest
articulation to date of the new jurisprudence of education and preven-
tion. In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass 'n,' the Court grappled with the
standards under which employers may be liable for punitive damages
in discrimination cases." Providing a literal interpretation of the
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made available to
intentional discrimination victims compensatory and punitive
damages,76 the majority held that Title VII plaintiffs must show that an
employer acted with malice or reckless indifference before obtaining
68. See Edelman et al., supra note 17, at 412-13.
69. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
70. Id
71. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,228 (1982).
72. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(f) (1997)).
73. Id at 806-09.
74. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
75. For interesting discussions of Kolstad, see Robert Belton, The Employment Law
Decisions of the 1998-99 Term of the Supreme Court: A Review, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL.
POL'Y J. 183, 199-207 (1999); Ann M. Anderson, Note, Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad
and the Limits of Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799,
828-30 (2000).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l)-(b)(1) (1994).
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punitive damages." The Court rejected the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia's interpretation that egregious
misconduct by the employer must be shown before a jury may consider
a punitive damage award."'
In a portion of the opinion joined by four other justices, however,
O'Connor provided employers with a shield from punitive damages if
they "engage in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII."' More-
over, she specifically referenced anti-discrimination policies and
programs as the kind of good faith efforts a court may look to in
deciding whether the shield should apply. A liability rule that reduces
the incentive for employers to undertake such preventative steps, noted
O'Connor, is contrary to the prophylactic purpose of Title VII.O Just as
the law promotes effective sexual harassment policies and grievance
procedures, so too does it encourage employers "to adopt anti-discrimi-
nation policies and to educate their personnel on Title VII's prohibi-
tions."'" Thus, the new approach to punitive damage liability aims to
deter discrimination by promoting preventative efforts, specifically,
policy promulgation and employee education.
That O'Connor's articulation of the prophylactic purpose of Title
VII pays such homage to employer anti-discrimination policies and
educational programs is not surprising. Amicus curiae briefs were filed
in Kolstad by three organizations with huge stakes in anti-discrimination
training: the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM),82 the
Chamber of Commerce,83 and the Equal Employment Advisory Council
(EEAC)." The last organization, the EEAC, describes its members as
"devot[ing] extensive resources to training, awareness, and compliance
programs designed to ensure that all their employment actions are
carried out in accordance with Title VII."' The EEAC brief forcefully
notes that most large corporations "provide regular, ongoing training to
ensure that their managerial, supervisory, and in appropriate instances
77. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994)).
78. Id. at 534-35.
79. Id. at 544.
80. See id. at 545 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417
(1975)).
81. Id.
82. Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management, Kolstad
v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208).
83. Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208).
84. Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council, Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208).
85. Id. at 2.
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even non-supervisory personnel, are aware of Title VII and other
employment-related laws." 6 It describes as "anomalous" any interpreta-
tion of Title VII that would subject such employers to punitive
damages."' Similar support for the "safe harbor proposal" is found in the
SRHM brief."8 That brief advocates the safe harbor because it "rewards
employers that take preventative measures" such as "effective EEO
training." 9 The views and practices of litigation avoidance profession-
als were before the Court, and O'Connor's rendition of Title ViI's
preventive aim placed on those practices a judicial stamp of approval.
How the Court's new approach will ultimately affect Title VII
doctrine is not now known. The claim by employer advocates that
training can limit employer liability for harassment, however, has
become quite specific since Ellerth and Faragher. For example, a little
less than a year before the Kolstad decision created a punitive damage
safe harbor for employers who take steps to educate their employees,
attorney Margaret McCausland stated that sexual harassment training
would likely keep a "jury [from] awarding punitive damages."'
Additionally, some training advocates represent Ellerth and Faragher as
expressly mandating sexual harassment training, even though the
decisions say absolutely nothing of the kind. Susan Meiseinger, of the
SHRM, put it this way: "The [C]ourt said ... [i]f you don't provide
some kind of sexual harassment training to your employees, you're
going to be liable."' Christine Amalfe, an attorney who regularly
conducts sexual harassment training, noted that "[tihe Supreme Court
has clearly indicated that employers .. .need to send a message to
employees" and that trainers are the "messengers."'92 Perhaps the
increased opportunity to sell their services, generated by employer
concern about the harassment decisions, prompted such comments.
Interestingly, the EEOC recently issued a policy document
interpreting the Ellerth and Faragher decisions that specifically
references sexual harassment training.9' Published in 1999, the guidance
suggests that employers provide all employees with training "to ensure
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id. at 13.
88. See SRHM Brief at 13, Kolstad (No. 98-208).
89. Id.
90. Aronson, supra note 55, at AI (quoting Margaret McCausland).
91. Ganzel, supra note 55, at 86 (quoting Susan Meisinger).
92. Id. (quoting Christine Amalfe).
93. Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors (June 18, 1999), EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (BNA), N:4075 [Binder 3].
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that they understand their rights and responsibilities." The EEOC
further recommends periodic supervisory training to "explain the types
of conduct that violate the employer's anti-harassment policy; the
seriousness of the policy; the responsibilities of supervisors and
managers when they learn of the alleged harassment; and the prohibi-
tion against retaliation."95 These suggestions will no doubt provide
further impetus for the training trend.
The evolution of sexual harassment training described above seems
a classic example of Edelman's theory of legal endogeneity. Employers
initially undertook sexual harassment training to evidence fair treatment
in the face of ambiguities about the law. Subsequently, the judiciary
recognized this extensive corporate practice through its articulation of
a new jurisprudence of education and prevention. Edelman's theory
then posits that the "professions, sometimes with greater enthusiasm
than is perhaps warranted, filter and disseminate court decisions" in a
way that reinforces and legitimates the initial organizational response
to the law." The comments of training advocates in the wake of Ellerth
and Faragher are filtering those decisions for the trainers' constitu-
ents--employers subject to anti-discrimination law-thereby bolstering
the practice of conducting sexual harassment training.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HARASSMENT TRAINING AS PRACTICE AND
JURISPRUDENCE
Edelman's theory warns that one should be cautious in permitting
those subject to a law to define its terms. This admonishment certainly
applies to sexual harassment training, which, as noted above, is an
extensive employer practice recently incorporated into Title VII
doctrine. In fact, sexual harassment training is more ubiquitous than
ever. It is not only employed in a preventative fashion, but also as a
method for correcting discriminatory work environments. For example,
in a number of recent well-publicized discrimination suit settlements
and consent decrees, the employer defendants agreed not only to
provide compensation for aggrieved plaintiffs, but also to allocate
significant sums for sexual harassment training."
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id. at 28.
96. Edelman et al., supra note 17, at 447.
97. See Mathiason & de Bemardo, supra note 6, at 27; Muller, supra note 2, at 94.
See generally Mitsubishi Settlement, supra note 2.
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Courts frequently cite sexual harassment training as evidence that
an employer acted reasonably to prevent harassment and thus satisfies
the first prong of the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense.9" Moreover,
sexual harassment training undertaken subsequent to an investigation
of an employee complaint is typically viewed as a prompt remedial
response enabling an employer to avoid liability." Training is likewise
portrayed as a valuable undertaking in judicial decisions considering
whether a prayer for punitive damages is appropriate. Courts in two
recent cases granted employer motions for summary judgment on the
issue of punitive damages, holding that sexual harassment training was
evidence of employer good faith."
Given the prevalence of sexual harassment training, one might
assume that its utility is beyond dispute. Yet very little empirical
98. E.g., Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that
in "addition to distributing [a sexual harassment] policy to its employees, [the
employer] regularly conducted training sessions on sexual harassment"); Hetreed v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 1999 WL 311728, at *5 (N.D. I11. May 12, 1999) (noting with
approval that the employer had a detailed sexual harassment policy and provided
managers with training); DeWitt v. Lieberman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 280, 287, 290 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (noting that the defendant had "an anti-sexual harassment training program" and
then concluding that the policy was effective); EEOC v. Barton Protective Servs., 47
F. Supp. 2d 57, 60 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that the employer provided "EEO training");
Maddin v. GTE of Florida, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (citing
favorably the fact that the employer "provided training about sexual harassment for its
employees and supervisors"); Fiscus v. Triumph Group Operations, 24 F. Supp. 2d
1229, 1240 (D. Kan. 1998) (stating that the company "conducted anti-harassment
workshops/training for its supervisors"); Landrau Romero v. Caribbean Rests., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 185, 191-92 (D.P.R. 1998) (noting that the plaintiff received training in sexual
harassment).
99. See, e.g., Mirakhorli v. DFW Mgmt. Co., 1999 WL 354226, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
May 24, 1999) (citing as favorable evidence fact that company renewed harassment
training after investigating plaintiff's complaint); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs:, 1999 WL
226208, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 1999) (noting that after investigating plaintiffs
complaint, "the company conducted mandatory sexual harassment training for [all]
employees"); Garcia v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 351, 358 n.6 (N.D. Ohio
1996) (noting that employer had a sexual harassment perpetrator watch a sensitivity
training video).
100. Woodward v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 2000 WL 680415, at
"16 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2000); Hull v. APCOA/Standard Parking Corp., 2000 WL
198881, at *15 (N.D. III. Feb. 14, 2000). Contra Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206
F.3d 431, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2000) (indicating that punitive damages appropriate
notwithstanding anti-discrimination training due to evidence of top executives' racial
animosity). The Tenth Circuit recently held that an employer's failure to provide a
manager with "training in employment discrimination" demonstrated a failure "to
educate its employees" and "to prevent discrimination in the workplace," making an
award of punitive damages appropriate. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241,
1248-49 (10th Cir. 1999).
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research has been conducted on the effects of these programs."0'
Although the lack of hard evidence has generally failed to capture the
attention of employers, attorneys, and judges, ignorance about these
matters is disturbing to social scientists.
Calling the gap in the sexual harassment literature "alarming," John
Pryor and Kathleen McKinney note that we "really are not sure about
what, if anything, works to educate people about sexual harassment
[and to] reduce incidents of harassment."' 2 Robert Moyer and Anjan
Nath recently described the problem this way: "[T]he unpleasant
empirical truth is that almost nothing is known about the effects of
sexual harassment education and training programs."
0 3
Some might view the scarcity of program outcome research as
benign. Elizabeth O'Hare Grundmann and her colleagues, however,
point out that the dearth of information is potentially dangerous for two
reasons."°4 First, preventative programs, even when adopted with the
best of intentions, can have negative effects."°5 For example, a seminar
that indicates that sexual harassment is an underreported phenomenon
may give some employees the message that "the likelihood is good that
they can get away with harassing" others." Training can also produce
backlash effects such as prompting fears on the part of senior men about
offering crucial mentoring to young professional women' or creating
resentment on the part of those whose attendance at the program is
required.0 8
Second, providing training "gives the impression that 'something
is being done,"' lulling managers and others into a false sense of
101. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound
of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 30-36 (2001)
(reviewing current research on sexual harassment training).
102. John B. Pryor & Kathleen McKinney, Research on Sexual Harassment: Lingering
Issues and Future Directions, 17 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYcHOL. 605, 609 (1995).
103. Robert S. Moyer & Anjan Nath, Some Effects of Brief Training Interventions on
Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 28 J, OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 334 (1998).
104. Elizabeth O'Hare Grundmann et al., The Prevention of Sexual Harassment, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 175, 182 (William
O'Donohue ed., 1997).
105. See id.
106. Id
107. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's
Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 376-77 (1995).
108. Barbara A. Gutek, Sexual Harassment Policy Initiatives, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT, supra note 104, at 195 ("[O]ne problem with
mandatory training is that it creates resentment and may result in very little learning.").
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security."° Yet an ineffective program may not affect the bottom line in
the least; that is, it may not "reduce the incidence of sexual harassment"
in the organization."'
In line with these problems, Grundmann and her colleagues find
particularly worrisome the motivation behind the adoption of many
anti-discrimination training programs: litigation prevention."' This
understandable impetus for training can eclipse what should be the
purpose of such programs-to have "a significant impact on an
important social problem.""' To accomplish that aim through training,
an institution must strive to implement a "demonstrably effective
program" that is systematically evaluated." 3 Unfortunately, employers
typically do not evaluate their anti-discrimination training programs." 4
Social scientists have only in the last few years begun to assess the
effects of sexual harassment training programs."' The results of these
early studies are highly inconclusive. While there is some slim evidence
that training increases the sensitivity of trainees to possible instances of
harassment," 6 the conclusion that trainees become more expert at
identifying harassment is debatable." 7 While there is slim evidence that
training, at least in a laboratory setting, may positively affect inappro-
priate touching behavior by men with a high propensity to harass, that
same training did not affect their long-term attitudes.' Finally, that
trainees will be able to retain knowledge and transfer it to their
workplace encounters is entirely uncertain. ' There is, in light of
currently available research, absolutely no scientific basis for conclud-
ing that harassment training fosters employee tolerance and greatly
alters workplace culture.
109. Grundmann et al., supra note 104, at 182.
110. Id.
111. See id at 176; see also Gutek, supra note 108, at 187 (noting that employers
consider training a "useful" step "in defending themselves in a court case"); Keyton &
Rhodes, supra note 53, at 161 (1999) ("Unfortunately, the primary objective of many
[sexual harassment] training programs is to reduce the organization's legal and
fiduciary responsibility.").
112. Grundmann etal., supra note 104, at 176.
113. Id. at 182.
114. See id. at 176.
115. See Gutek, supra note 108, at 196 (describing current research on harassment
training effectiveness as scant yet promising).
116. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 101, at 31-32 & nn. 236-42.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
[Vol. 24
2 SEXUAL HARASSMENT TRAINING
The scant empirical evidence described above should give pause
to those in the legal profession who wholeheartedly endorse training as
a foolproof antidote to workplace sexual harassment. An undiscerning
view of the value of such programs may stymie the achievement of
workplace equality.'20 In other words, seeing all such training as
positive may make the goal of these programs-the elimination of
harassment-that much harder to achieve.'
Moreover, the risks associated with ineffective training pro-
grams-backlash, sending the wrong message, and creating the
erroneous impression that "something is being done about harass-
ment"--are too potentially destructive to tolerate. And while an
uninformed understanding of the implications of sexual harassment
training is troubling, incorporating that viewpoint into Title VII
jurisprudence deals a potentially devastating blow to the law's
effectiveness. An uncritical embrace of the jurisprudence of education
and prevention requires acceptance of legal compliance in form rather
than in substance. Yet if equality is to be more than cosmetic-indeed
if Title VII's preventative purpose is to be fulfilled-courts must look
beyond symbols to determine whether the environment in which a
plaintiff worked was actually discriminatory. Thus, as will be discussed
in Part V, no training program should be considered relevant in
litigation unless, in the context of a given dispute, it is demonstrably
effective.
V. CONCLUSION: REFORMULATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
Until we know much more about sexual harassment training and its
effects, the existence of these programs should not be considered a fact
relevant to employer liability for compensatory damages in any
discrimination suit." To allow a corporate practice with only specula-
120. See Gutek, supra note 108, at 196 (warning that "[in their eagerness to show
that they are doing something" employers may be selecting trainers who lack
knowledge about harassment).
121. Craig Haney and Aida Hurtado issued a similar warning. in another context.
They argue that excessive faith in standardized employment tests diverts "public and
political attention away from the structural legacies of slavery and racism." Craig
Haney & Aida Hurtado, The Jurisprudence of Race and Meritocracy, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 223, 244 (1994).
122. Theresa Beiner makes a similar suggestion about employer preventative efforts
in sexual harassment cases, arguing that such efforts are only relevant at the punitive
damage stage. See Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications
of Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employersfor Sexual Harassment, 7 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 332 (2001). Professor Beiner notes that her approach
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tive value to influence the make whole recovery of an employee injured
by a sexually hostile environment is too destructive of employee rights
to be countenanced. Sexual harassment training programs are general
preventative efforts undertaken by employers, easily "decoupled from
day-to-day organizational [activity]."'" Thus, the existence of anti-
discrimination training tells us little about the particular workplace
conditions encountered by discrimination plaintiffs.
On the other hand, evidence of training efforts may be relevant to
the issue of punitive damages. 24 Specifically, educational efforts may
bear upon whether the employer's "good-faith efforts to prevent
discrimination in the workplace" prohibit the imposition of vicarious
liability for punitive relief, the standard adopted by the Supreme Court
in Kolstad.' Those considering such evidence, however, must be
exceedingly careful. Indeed, in reviewing the relevancy of educational
programs, or for that matter, considering the incorporation of training
into settlement agreements, three principles must be kept in mind.
First, conducting training cannot be equated with fostering cultural
change. Social scientists note that employers that want to rectify
discriminatory environments must tie training to specific organizational
policies and systems designed to accomplish the task. 2" For example,
an employer that wishes to eliminate glass ceilings would carefully
analyze and perhaps revise career paths, train supervisors about the
issue, and institute a system of rewards for achieving diversity goals.'27
Judges and juries should be reluctant to credit employers for educa-
tional efforts that are not "reinforced by policies, activities, and
incentives within the organization. " ""
Second, no training regimen should be wholeheartedly embraced
or considered relevant before a meaningful assessment of its features
"strikes a balance between the compensatory nature of Title VII and the policy of
encouraging employers to address and prevent sexual harassment." Id.
123. Edelman & Petterson, supra note 11, at 113-14.
124. Professor Beiner likewise finds training programs to be highly relevant at the
punitive damage phase. See Beiner, supra note 122, at 332-38.
125. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546(1999).
126. See Lee Ann Hollister et al., Diversity Programs: Key to Competitiveness or Just
Another Fad?, II ORG. DEV. J. 49, 58 (1993).
127. See id
128. Ruby L. Beale, Invited Reaction: Response to Environmental Factors and the
Effectiveness of Workforce Diversity Training, 9 HuM. REs. DEv. Q. 125, 126-27 (1998). It
should be noted that the Kolstad Court failed to describe the good faith safe harbor as
an affirmative defense that must be proven by the employer. See Belton, supra note 75,
at 205-06. Nonetheless, the discussion in this essay assumes that it is the employer, and
not the employee, who has the burden of proof on the good faith issue.
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and purported impact has been conducted. The training literature has
begun to detail characteristics that should be incorporated into all
training programs.129 Common recommendations include obtaining a
"visible commitment [to training] from top leaders," eschewing one-
shot training courses, selecting qualified facilitators, and carefully
assembling participant groups to avoid both homogeneity and
tokenism. 30 Also vitally important are mechanisms for long-term
program evaluation. 3' Employers proffering evidence of educational
efforts should be required to describe their courses' designs and the
methods by which they gauge program outcomes.'32
Finally, training, in order to be relevant to the issue of employer
good faith, must be considered in context with the events that give rise
to the suit. An employer may conduct training that appears successful
on an organization-wide basis and yet is obviously ineffective as
applied to the part of the organization in which the plaintiff works. The
training, in such a case, should not be dispositive evidence of good
faith. Similarly, a corporate educational program may appear effective
overall, but the employer's response to the plaintiff's harassment
complaint may nevertheless be defensive and inappropriate. The
program, in this example, should not bar the imposition of punitive
damages.'
129. See, e.g., Catherine Ellis & Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, Diverse Approaches to
Managing Diversity, 33 HuM. RESOURCE MGMT. 79, 101-02 (1994); Herff L. Moore et al.,
Eight Steps to a Sexual Harassment-Free Workplace, TRAINING & DEV., Apr. 1998, at 12;
Jonathan A. Segal, Sexual Harassment Prevention: Cement for the Glass Ceiling?, HR MAG.,
Nov. 1998, at 129.
130. Ellis & Sonnenfeld, supra note 129, at 101.
131. See Grundmann et al., supra note 104, at 182 (offering a list of methodological
considerations for evaluating training programs).
132. One reason employers are reluctant to evaluate their training programs is fear
that the findings could be used against them in subsequent discrimination litigation.
Indeed my colleagues working in the social sciences note that it has become incredibly
difficult to convince employers to open their doors to professional researchers. Creating
an evidentiary safe harbor for employers and providing an academic research privilege
for social scientists could ameliorate the concerns of employers and encourage
professional field research on anti-discrimination training. See generally Kathleen M.
Blee, The Perils of Privilege, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 993 (1999); Felice J. Levine &
John M. Kennedy, Promoting a Scholar's Privilege: Accelerating the Pace, 24 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 967 (1999); Robert H. McLaughlin, From the Field to the Courthouse: Should
Social Science Research Be Privileged?, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 927 (1999); Robert H.
McLaughlin, Privilege and Practice in Social Science Research, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
999 (1999); Rebecca Emily Rapp, In re Cusumano and the Undue Burden of Using the
Journalist Privilege as a Model for Protecting Researchers from Discovery, 29 J.L. & EDUC.
265 (2000); Sudhir Venkatesh, The Promise of Ethnograhic Research: The Researcher's
Dilemma, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 987 (1999).
133. I owe these examples and my thinking on this subject to the insights of Linda
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A good example of a contextual analysis of training relevancy can
be found in a recent Fourth Circuit opinion. In Lowery v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc.,"" the Fourth Circuit considered the propriety of an award of
punitive damages in a race discrimination case.' Circuit City proffered
evidence of its good faith efforts to educate its employees about its anti-
discrimination policy, focusing specifically on a week-long managerial
and supervisory training seminar entitled Managing Through People, a
small portion of which covered federal anti-discrimination laws. 36
Those efforts proved unavailing to the employer due to evidence that
the company was permeated by racism at the highest levels and that
African American employees feared reprisal for complaining about
discrimination."" The court noted that this latter evidence "called into
question" the "sincerity of Circuit City's commitment to a company-
wide policy against racial discrimination." 3 '
Some may argue that observing the three principles described
above imposes too great a burden on employers. To do otherwise,
however, is not only to refuse to face the truth about anti-discrimination
educational programs; it is to endorse a form over substance approach
to effectuating Title VII's preventative purpose. In Kolstad, the Supreme
Court adopted the safe harbor concept to avoid "[d]issuading employers
from implementing programs or policies to prevent discrimination."'39
If we really seek to encourage such efforts, only those employers
interested in meaningfully addressing employment bias should be
granted shelter from punitive damages.
Krieger.
134. 206 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2000).
135. Id. at 436.
136. Id. at 445.
137. See id. at 445-46.
138. Id. at 446.
139. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
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